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The Study
 What is the ‘revolving door’?
 Lobbying and the financial crisis
 The revolving door in Financial Services
 Regulatory Agencies
 The Fortune 500
 Precedents and practice: An overview of 
regulatory and ethics solutions to pre-and 
post employment conflicts
 Moving towards transparency and restoring 
trust
 Conclusions and recommendations
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Regulatory Capture
 ‗It is a common phenomenon in all areas of regulation 
that regulators become ‗captured‘ by the industry they 
regulate, meaning that they take on the objectives of 
management in the firms they regulate. They may 
thereby lose sight of the ultimate objectives of 
regulation. Regulatory capture is particularly serious in 
industries such as banking where there is a conflict of 
interest between the firms‘ objectives (to maximise 
profits) and the objectives of the regulation (to provide 
consumer protection and maintain systemic stability).‘
 Source: H. Benink, R. Schmidt, ―Europe‘s single market for financial 
services: views by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee‖, Journal of Financial Stability, 2004,  p. 186.
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Regulatory Capture?
 ‗In the case of legislators, I am convinced that over the 
years there has been too much ‗regulatory capture‘ by 
the sell side of the financial services market: Their 
lobbies have been strong and powerful.‘ 
 Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services
 Source:  Speech at the Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin, 
February 9, 2009. http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0209/mccreevyc.html
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Steps to the crisis
 1975 deregulation of the New York Stock 
Exchange on ‗May Day‘ 
 1979 ‗Volcker shock‘ 
 1986 The ‗Big Bang‘ deregulation of the London 
Stock Exchange
 1992 European Commission  banking directive
 1997 Independence of the Bank of England
 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
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Lobbying for financial 
deregulation
 ‗I would say it's probably the most 
heavily lobbied, most expensive issue to 
come before Congress in a generation. 
 Ed Yingling, chief lobbyist for the American Bankers 
Association on the lobby to repeal Glass-Steagall
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Lobbying for financial 
deregulation
 ‗Banking deregulation has been vigorously 
lobbied and debated for 20 years by three of the 
nation's wealthiest industries: banking, insurance 
and securities. In 1997 and 1998 alone, these 
three industries gave $58 million to Federal 
political candidates, according to compilations by 
the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan 
research group. They donated $87 million in so-
called soft money to the political parties, and they 
reported spending $163 million in additional 
lobbying expenses.‘
 Joel Brinkley, ‗Behind the Banking Bill, Years of Intense Lobbying‘, 
New York Times, October 23, 1999 
http://partners.nytimes.com/library/financial/102399bank-lobby.html
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Lobbying and the 
Revolving door
 A great many of those lobbyists entered and exited through the revolving 
door connecting the lobbying world with government. Surveying only 20 
leading firms in the financial sector (none from the insurance industry or 
real estate), we found that 142 industry lobbyists during the period 
1998-2008 had formerly worked as ―covered officials‖ in the government. 
―Covered officials‖ are top officials in the executive branch (most political 
appointees, from members of the cabinet to directors of bureaus 
embedded in agencies), Members of Congress, and congressional staff. 
 Nothing evidences the revolving door — or Wall Street‘s direct influence 
over policymaking — more than the stream of Goldman Sachs expatriates 
who left the Wall Street goliath, spun through the revolving door, and 
emerged to hold top regulatory positions. Topping the list, of course, are 
former Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson, both of 
whom had served as chair of Goldman Sachs before entering government. 
 Robert Weissman and James Donahue Sold Out: How Wall Street and Washington 
Betrayed America March 2009, Essential Information ,  Consumer Education 
Foundation  http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/soldoutreport.htm p. 100-101.
 .
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Revolving door in 
regulatory agencies 
 Australian Securities and Investment Commission
 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
 Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances -
Belgium
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – U.S.A.
 Financial Services Authority – U.K.
 The Financial Supervisory Authority - Iceland
 Financial Services Regulatory Authority - Ireland
 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions –
Canada
 Securities Commission – New Zealand
 Securities and Exchange Commission – U.S.A.
 UK Financial Investments Ltd
 European Commission High Level Group
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Revolving door in 
regulatory agencies 
 The regulators examined with the most 
numerous links were those of Ireland, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.  Regulators in 
Belgium, Canada, Iceland and the United States 
were found to be more likely to recruit individuals 
from public institutions like Central Banks, 
government or other regulatory agencies.  In 
Australia the ASIC was particularly notable for its 
high proportion of commercial lawyers, whilst 
regulators in Belgium, Canada, and the United 
States, were also more likely to recruit individuals 
from law and accountancy; many of whom 
nevertheless work – albeit indirectly – in the field 
of banking and finance. 
06-Jul-2009 11
Revolving door and 
the Financial Services 
Authority
 Since January 2000 there have been 36 different 
members of the FSA board. 
 The data show that 26 of the members had 
connections at board or senior level with the 
banking and finance industry either before or 
after their term or office.
 Nine continued to hold appointments in financial 
corporations while they were at the FSA . 
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Fortune Global 500 
Companies
 Table 1. Financial Industry Corporations from the 
Fortune Global 500

Number of companies
 Banks: Commercial and Savings 67
 Insurance Property and casualty (stock) 15
 Insurance Property and casualty (mutual) 3
 Insurance: Life, Health (stock) 19
 Insurance: Life, Health (mutual) 8
 Securities 4
 Total 116
06-Jul-2009 13
Fortune Global 500 
Companies
 Table 2. Financial Industry Corporations from the 
Fortune Global 500

Average no. of 
Revolving Door connections
 Banks: Commercial and Savings 2.4
 Insurance Property and casualty (stock) 1.7
 Insurance Property and casualty (mutual) 0
 Insurance: Life, Health (stock) 1.7
 Insurance: Life, Health (mutual) 0.6
 Securities 8.5
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Fortune Global 500 
Companies
 Table 3. Financial Industry Corporations from the 
Fortune Global 500 by geographical region
Average no. of 
Revolving Door connections
 North America 
 United States, Canada 2.4
 Europe 
 Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, 
 France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
 Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 2.9
 East Asia 
 China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan 0.8
 Australia 1
 Brazil 0.3
 India 1
 Russia 3
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Fortune Global 500 
Companies
 Table 4. Financial Industry Corporations from the 
Fortune Global 500 European breakdown
Average no. of 
Revolving Door connections
 Switzerland 6.2
 (UBS, Credit Suisse, Zurich Financial Services, Swiss 
Reinsurance and Swiss Life)
 United Kingdom 4.8
 Rest of Europe 2.3
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Precedents and 
practice 
 ‗Regardless of the philosophical bent of those in office, 
formal ‗governmental regulatory systems can be 
dismantled only to the extent that the public's 
reasonable expectations of private sector performance 
and conduct could be, with reasonable likelihood, 
otherwise satisfied. Conversely, if the private sector 
itself does not provide an environment which fosters 
public trust and confidence, no political office holder 
could insulate it from the consequences.‘
 Former Chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Williams, Washington,D.C. 
February 27,1981 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/022781williams.pdf
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Precedents and 
practice 
 2. Revolving Door Ban All Appointees Entering 
Government. I will not for a period of 2 years from the date of 
my appointment participate in any particular matter involving 
specific parties that is directly and substantially related to my 
former employer or former clients, including regulations and 
contracts.
 3. Revolving Door Ban Lobbyists Entering Government. If I 
was a registered lobbyist within the 2 years before the date of 
my appointment, in addition to abiding by the limitations of 
paragraph 2, I will not for a period of 2 years after the date of 
my appointment:
 (a) participate in any particular matter on which I lobbied 
within the 2 years before the date of my appointment;
 (b) participate in the specific issue area in which that 
particular matter falls; or
 (c) seek or accept employment with any executive agency 
that I lobbied within the 2 years before the date of my 
appointment.
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Precedents and 
practice 
 4. Revolving Door Ban Appointees Leaving Government. If, 
upon my departure from the Government, I am covered by the 
post employment restrictions on communicating with 
employees of my former executive agency set forth in section 
207(c) of title 18, United States Code, I agree that I will abide 
by those restrictions for a period of 2 years following the end 
of my appointment.
 5. Revolving Door Ban Appointees Leaving Government to 
Lobby. In addition to abiding by the limitations of paragraph 4, 
I also agree, upon leaving Government service, not to lobby 
any covered executive branch official or non career Senior 
Executive Service appointee for the remainder of the 
Administration. 
 Barack Obama, ‗Executive Order -- Ethics Commitments by Executive 
Branch Personnel‘, The White House, January 21, 2009 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrder-
EthicsCommitments/
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Regulating Science
 ‗balance‘ between the priority to 
encourage the financial sector and the 
public interest.
 ‗public interest‘ and the ‗private interest‘ 
as synonymous 
 ‗conflict of interests‘ versus ‗experience‘ 
or ‗expertise‘ 
 Range of solutions include disclosure, 
management of conflicts and their 
elimination 
 Expertise, experience and legitimacy 
required – not necessarily ‗private 
interests‘
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Proposals 1 – Pre-
employment
 Development of clear rules and procedures regarding divestment of 
interests upon joining public service from industry;
 Wider use of blind trusts as a means of disposing of assets and interests 
that may create conflicts while in public office;
 Prohibition on use of blind management arrangements where officials or 
public office holders can be made aware of their trust portfolio and its 
performance;
 Development of rules and procedures to bar regulatory appointments for 
person‘s whose employment background would tend to create frequent 
impartiality conflicts; 
 Strengthening of recusal rules and procedures that bar appointees from 
handling matters involving their former employers in the private sector, once 
they have entered public service; 
 Introduce mandatory recusal on matters directly involving one‘s former 
employers and clients including regulations and contracts during a defined 
period after taking office;
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Proposals 2 – Pre-
employment
 Require lobbyists entering government to recuse for a specified period from a) 
participation in any particular matter on which they lobbied; b) participation in 
the specific issue area in which that particular matter falls; c) seeking or 
accepting employment with any agency that the person lobbied for a specified 
period before the date of the appointment.
 Requiring officials as part of their terms and conditions of employment in the 
public sector to enter into a binding ethics ‗entry plan‘ to clarify what activities 
will be prohibited; 
 Requiring a list of the relevant interests of decision-makers within the public 
service, and summaries of their career histories outside the public service to be 
made public. Senior public servants would be required to put on a publicly 
available register details of past employment in the private sector (for the 
previous 5 years), along with details of current outside interests; 
 Requiring a database of gifts and hospitality (above a token value) received by 
Ministers, their advisors and Senior public servants and regulators;
 Prohibition of regulatory staff from maintaining positions with financial sector or 
other corporations while serving on regulatory agencies;
 Strengthening the separation of interests from regulatory authorities by 
ensuring that regulatory agencies contain at least a significant proportion of 
board members with no or no recent senior involvement with financial sector 
business.2003:1)
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Proposals 3 - Post 
employment 
 Strengthening of recusal rules and procedures that bar appointees 
from handling matters involving their former employers in the private 
sector once they have left public service; 
 Introduce mandatory recusal on matters directly involving one‘s 
employers and clients during a defined period prior to taking office; 
 Prohibiting senior officials from seeking employment with outside 
interests that may have benefited from policies formulated by those 
officials; 
 Early notification of employment negotiation between officials and 
private sector employers; 
 Extending the period during which officials cannot engage in lobbying 
after leaving office and expanding the scope of prohibited activities 
beyond direct representation to include the preparation, strategy work 
and supervision of lobbying activity designed to facilitate lobbying;
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Proposals 4 - Post 
employment 
 Requiring officials as part of their terms and conditions of employment 
in the public sector to enter into a binding ethics ‗exit plan‘ when 
leaving the public sector to clarify what activities will be prohibited; 
 Require binding revolving-door exit plans that sets forth the policy 
issues which the former employee is banned from working. Such 
reports should be available to the public; 
 Prohibit, for a specified period of time, political appointees or special 
advisors and senior policymakers from being able to seek employment 
with private interests that may have significantly benefited from the 
policies they formulated; 
 Require recently retired government officials and their new private 
sector employers to file revolving-door reports attesting that the former 
government employee and their employers have complied with the 
agreed revolving door exit plan. 
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